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Missouri's Second Injury Fund - Should It

Stay or Should It Go?: An Examination of
the Question Facing the Missouri State
Legislature
I. INTRODUCTION
Missouri's Second Injury Fund ("Fund") is a workers' compensation
arrangement that provides state assistance to employers by reducing their
liability to employees who have preexisting disabilities and are subsequently
injured on the job.' Throughout 2007 and 2008, the Fund was the subject of
numerous headlines and debates that involved all three branches of the state
government.
First, the state's highest court
•
2 delivered the controversial decision of
Schoemehl v. Treasurerof Missouri. Here, the Missouri Supreme Court held
that the surviving dependents of a deceased employee were entitled to
disability benefits from the Fund under state law. Criticism immediately
followed this opinion, as it permitted surviving dependents to step into the
shoes of deceased employees and receive benefits for a disability that died
with the employee.4
Following Schoemehl, the state's executive officer, then-Governor Matt
Blunt, alerted state agencies that the Fund was nearing insolvency.5 The
Governor added that the decision in Schoemehl only complicated the
solvency issue because it extended the Fund's disability benefits liability
beyond the employee to surviving dependents. 6 Audits and actuarial reviews
conducted after the Governor's alert confirmed concerns about the Fund's

1. Searcy v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Co., 894 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Mo. App.
E.D. 1995), overruled by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo.
2003) (en banc).
2. 217 S.W.3d 900 (Mo. 2007) (en banc), superseded by statute, H.R. 1883,
94th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008), as recognized in Bennett v. Treasurer of
Mo., 271 S.W.3d 49 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008).

3. Id. at 901-02.
4. See, e.g., Mary Anne Lindsey & James B. Kennedy, Employee Dies, Benefits
Survive, RISK MGMT., Sept. 1, 2007, at 10, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/
legal/trial-procedure-decisions-rulings/8911206-1 .html.
5. See SUSAN MONTEE, MO. STATE AUDITOR, LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS: SECOND INJURY FUND, REPORT No. 2007-19, at 27 (2007) (Governor's
letter requesting audit), available at http://www.auditor.mo.gov/press/2007-19.pdf.

6. Id.
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solvency and projected that its resources would be depleted as early as the
end of 2008.7
In response to growing concerns, the state legislature attempted to
address the Schoemehl decision and the Fund's imminent insolvency.
Subsequently, the legislature only addressed the Schoemehl decision by
instituting a "fix" that abrogated future application of the Schoemehl
decision. Despite numerous proposals, no legislation was passed to address
the financial distress of the Fund. It is now the onus of the 2009 state
legislature to decide what course of action to take regarding the Fund's
solvency.
This Law Summary will start by explaining the concepts underlying the
Fund within the workers' compensation system. It will then move to an indepth look at the Fund's recent developments in the judicial, executive, and
legislative arenas. Finally, this Law Summary will analyze and attempt to
answer the ultimate question facing the 2009 state legislature: what should be
done with the Fund? This will include an examination of the Fund's future
liability under its current claims and the Schoemehl decision, the need for the
Fund in the wake on anti-disability discrimination laws, and adjustments and
alternatives for the legislature to consider for increasing the Fund's revenues
and decreasing its expenditures.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Workers' Compensation Generally
Today's workers' compensation laws originated from an early 1900's
movement against job-related injuries and deaths resulting from worker
interaction with machinery and the inadequate remedies for injured workers
in the common law tort system. 9 As a result, workers' compensation laws
were established throughout the country to "provide a limited
and exclusive
'0
remedy for employees injured in work-related accidents."'

7. See generally MONTEE, supra note 5; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP,
MISSOURI SECOND INJURY FUND: ACTUARIAL REVIEW 1, 3 (2007), available at
http://www.dolir.mo.gov/WC/2nd_Injury_Fund.pdf [hereinafter ActuarialReview].
8. See 2008 Mo. Laws 442.
9. Amanda M. Jones, Comment, Hawai'i's Workers' Compensation Scheme:
An Employer's License To Kill?, 29 U. HAW. L. REv. 211, 213-15 (2006). Prior to
workers' compensation laws, injured workers rarely succeeded in suits against their
employers primarily due to three common law defenses: "the fellow servant rule,
contributory negligence, and assumption of risk." Id.at 214. The fellow servant rule
proved to be most troublesome to injured workers' claims, as it released employers
from liability where the injury resulted from the negligence of a fellow employee. Id.
10. Id. at 215.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol74/iss2/8
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In 1927 Missouri established its first set of workers' compensation laws,
which provided a no-fault system of compensation for workers."
The
purpose of workers' compensation laws is to satisfy injured workers' need for
financial support that is not always adequately met by private insurance and
tort claim awards, and to provide a less costly and more efficient process than
such traditional remedies.' 2 The workers' compensation system provides an
alternative system to ameliorate losses sustained by employees received in the
scope of work.' 3 In application, the workers' compensation system serves a
"dual role" - it protects employers by limiting monetary awards and tortious
lawsuits against them, while simultaneously providing employees with
medical treatment for work-related injuries, payment of lost wages, additional
compensation for permanent disabilities, and physical rehabilitation. 14

B. The Second Injury Fund Concept
Within the workers' compensation system, the Missouri Legislature also
created a scheme called the Second Injury Fund to assist employers in
compensating employees with preexisting disabilities who were injured on
the job. Created in 1943, the Fund operated to financially assist the
physically handicapped and individuals with existing work-related disabilities
and aimed to encourage employers to hire and retain previously disabled
individuals. 15 Specifically, the Fund also sought to limit the liability of
employers in situations where an employee with a preexisting disability was
injured at work and subsequently incurred a more severe disability.' 6 Prior to
the creation of the Fund, employers were hesitant to hire such individuals due
to the possibility that the preexisting disability would combine with a later
on-the-job injury to produce an overall greater disability, and accordingly,
increase employer liability.' 7 The Fund alleviated these concerns by assuring

11. Bethel v. Sunlight Janitor Serv., 551 S.W.2d 616, 618 (Mo. 1977) (en banc);
Bi-State Dev. Agency v. Watson, 40 S.W.3d 403, 405 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001).
12. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 83-84 (1971); Walter J. Ashbrook,
Comment, Defining "Employee" Within Arizona's Workers' Compensation Statute:
An Argument for Inclusion, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 691, 694 (2008).

13. Bethel, 551 S.W.2d at 618. Losses sustained by employees also could
include losses that were indirectly inflicted on the employees' dependents. Id.
14. See DeLong v. Hampton Envelope Co., 149 S.W.3d 549, 556 (Mo. App.
E.D. 2004); MO. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 50-1.010 (2001).
15. MONTEE, supra note 5, at 3; see also James B. Slusher, The Second Injury
Fund, 26 Mo. L. REV. 328, 328 (1961).

16. See Roby v. Tarlton Corp., 728 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Mo. App. E.D. 1987)
(citing Meilves v. Morris, 422 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Mo. 1968)).
17. Wuebbeling v. W. County Drywall, 898 S.W.2d 615, 617-18 (Mo. App. E.D.
1995). Slusher provided an example of the employer's dilemma: "A man with only
one leg might easily become permanently and totally disabled if he were to lose his
other leg in the roundhouse, and his employer might choose to forego the risk of
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
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employers that they would not be exposed to a greater amount of liability
than that which resulted from the subsequent work-related injury.' Thus,
liability for an employee's injury is shared between the employer and the
Fund - the employer is responsible for the portion of the disability that can be
injury, while the Fund is responsible for the
attributed to the work-related
9
remaining disability.'
The Fund primarily provides compensation to employees with a
preexisting disability who sustain either a work-related permanent partial
disability ("PPD") or a permanent total disability ("PTD").2 ° Missouri
workers' compensation law defines permanent partial disability as "a
disability that is permanent in nature and partial in degree. ' 21 In other words,
it is a disability which is permanent in its duration, but is partial in the sense
that the disability impairs the individual only to a degree and does not prevent
the individual from acquiring some form of gainful employment.2 An
receives benefits in a fixed amount for a
individual that is found to be PPD
23
predetermined number of weeks.
PTD is defined as an "inability to return to any employment and not
merely [an] inability to return to the employment in which the employee was
engaged at the time of the accident., 24 The phrase "inability to return to any
employment" refers to the employee's inability to perform the usual duties of
the employment in the manner that an average person engaged in such
The words "any
employment customarily performs such duties. 25
employment" mean "any reasonable or normal employment" or occupation,
as it is not necessary that the employee be completely inactive in order to
meet this statutory definition. Individuals who are found to be PTD receive
benefits in a flexible manner as the benefits are based on the continuance of
payments for this permanent and total liability by using the simple expedient of hiring
another switchman." Slusher, supranote 15, at 328.
18. Searcy v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Co., 894 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Mo. App.
E.D. 1995).
19. Roller v. Treasurer of Mo., 935 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Mo. App. S.D. 1996).
20. See MONTEE, supra note 5, at 5. PPD and PTD compensation made up
91.4% of the Fund's expenditures in 2006, totaling over $62 million. Id.
21. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.190.6(1) (Supp. 2008). Missouri courts have
determined that a "[p]ermanent partial disability [determination] is not dependent on
the employee's inability to work ... [and is] 'provided only after temporary disability
compensation is discontinued."' See Cardwell v. Treasurer of Mo., 249 S.W.3d 902,
910 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008) (internal citations omitted) (citing Landers v. Chrysler
Corp., 963 S.W.2d 275, 285 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997); quoting Schuster v. State Div. of
Employment Sec., 972 S.W.2d 377, 381 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998)).
22. Slusher, supra note 15, at 328.
23. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.190.1.
24. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.020.6 (Supp. 2008).
25. Kowalski v. M-G Metals & Sales, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 919, 922 (Mo. App. S.D.
1982).
26. Brown v. Treasurer of Mo., 795 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol74/iss2/8
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the employee's27 life and the particular disability that prevents the employee
from working.
Section 287.220.1 of the Missouri Revised Statutes establishes the
requirements for employees claiming compensation from the Fund for both
PPD and PTD disabilities. 28 For PPDs, a parsing of the statute makes it clear
that an employee seeking Fund compensation must first establish a
preexisting PPD and a subsequent work-related PPD, both of which must
meet certain minimum statutory requirements. 29 Next, and most importantly,
the employee must show that the combination of the independent and
preexisting disabilities resulted in a substantially greater disability than the
sum of the independent disabilities. 30 This showing is critical to qualifying
for the Fund. If the two disabilities do not combine to create a greater overall
disability, the Fund's liability is not triggered and the employee is limited to
recovery from the employer for the degree or percentage of disability which
would have resulted solely from the
work-related injury without
3
consideration of the preexisting disability. '
The following example illustrates the typical application of the Fund's
requirements for PPDs. John Doe, employed by the local lumber yard,
previously suffered the loss of his right thumb (i.e., a preexisting PPD). One
day, while completing his usual task of chopping down trees, John mistakenly
leaves his left thumb in the path of a moving axe and suffers the loss of his
left thumb (i.e., a subsequent work-related disability). Independently, the loss
of each thumb constitutes a PPD; however, the loss of both thumbs combines
to create a substantially greater permanent disability as John will not be able
to perform any tasks requiring the use
of at least one thumb, such as swinging
32
an axe with a sufficiently tight grip.

27. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.200.1 (Supp. 2008).
28. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.220.1 (2000).
29. Id. For the preexisting PPD, the employee must show the disability is:
of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to employment
or to obtaining reemployment if the employee becomes unemployed, and
the preexisting permanent partial disability, if a body as a whole injury,
equals a minimum of fifty weeks of compensation or, if a major extremity
injury only, equals a minimum of fifteen percent permanent partial
disability, according to the medical standards that are used in determining
such compensation.
Id. For the subsequent PPD, the employee must show that the disability is "an
amount equal to a minimum of fifty weeks compensation, if a body as a whole injury
or, if a major extremity injury only, equals a minimum of fifteen percent permanent
partial disability." Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. "[T]he employer at the time of the last injury shall be liable only for the
degree or percentage of disability which would have resulted from the last injury had
there been no preexisting disability." Id.
32. This example has been adapted from Slusher, supra note 15, at 329-30.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
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As a result, the employer would be liable for the loss of John's left
thumb, the subsequent work-related disability, while the Fund would be liable
for the difference between the loss of John's left thumb and John's resulting
disability from the combination of the two disabilities, the loss of both
thumbs.
Section 287.220.1 establishes less restrictive requirements for situations
when the employee's injury results in permanent total disability. Under this
section, the employee must show that the two disabilities combine to create a
PTD; no minimum requirements apply. 33 If the employee can make this
showing, the employer is liable solely for the disability resulting from the
subsequent work-related injury and the Fund is liable for the remainder of
compensation that would be due under PTD.34
Returning to the previous example, assume that John Doe previously
suffered the loss of his right arm at his shoulder, and subsequently suffers the
loss of his left arm at his shoulder in a work-related accident. Under these
facts, it is quite possible that this could constitute a PTD because the loss of
both arms could result in an inability to return to any employment.35 If it is
determined that John suffered a PTD, John's employer would be liable for the
loss of his left36 arm, and the Fund would be liable for the remainder due to
John for PTD.

Since 1943, the Fund has undergone some minor changes, but its
underlying concept has remained unchanged. In recent years, however,
Missouri's Second Injury Fund has been examined and altered by the
judiciary and legislature, and concems about the solvency of the Fund have
emerged. It appears that major changes are on the way for the state's Fund,
including the possibility of its termination.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

A. Missouri Supreme Court'sDecisions in Schoemehl and Strait
In Schoemehl v. Treasurerof Missouri,37 the Missouri Supreme Court's
holding created a new method of recovery against the Fund for dependents of
deceased employees. 38 In Schoemehl, an employee sustained a work-related
33. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.220.1.
34. Id.
35. Under Kansas workers' compensation law, the "loss of both eyes, both
hands, both arms, both feet, or both legs, or any combination thereof, in the absence
of proof to the contrary, [constitutes] a permanent total disability." See KAN. STAT.

§ 44-510c(a)(2).
36. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.220.1.
37. 217 S.W.3d 900 (Mo. 2007) (en banc), superseded by statute, H.R. 1883,

ANN.

94th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008), as recognizedin Bennett v. Treasurer of
Mo., 271 S.W.3d 49 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008).
38. Id. at 903.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol74/iss2/8
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knee injury that rendered him permanently and totally disabled in
combination with his preexisting disabilities. 39 Subsequently, the employee
died from causes unrelated to his injury, and the emplo ,ee's sole dependent,
his wife, brought a claim for benefits from the Fund. The dependent was
awarded PTD benefits from the Fund from the time of the employee's injury
until the date of the employee's death, a total of less than five weeks. 4' The
dependent appealed, arguing she was entitled to PTD benefits from the Fund
for the remainder of her life because she was a dependent and therefore an
44
"employee"
under § 287.020.1. 42 The Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern
District disagreed, however, ruling that because an employee is not entitled to
compensation for PTD benefits after death, the dependents of an employee
are, likewise, not entitled to such benefits after the date of an employee's
death.43
The Missouri Supreme Court granted transfer and a majority of four
held that where an injured employee receiving PTD benefits dies from causes
unrelated to the work-related injury, the right to compensation for such
benefits survives to the dependents of that injured employee. 44 In reaching
this decision, the majority analyzed three statutory sections,45 relying largely
on language from one of these sections, § 287.230.2.
Specifically, this
section provided that when an employee is entitled to compensation and the
employee dies from a cause unrelated to his work injury, compensation
ceases "unless there are surviving dependents at the time of death. ''4 Further,
the court found that nothing distinguished compensation for PTD benefits
from other benefits, and that the definition of "employee" included the
39. Id.at 901; Fred Schoemehl, Injury No. 01-046332, Labor & Indus. Relations
Comm'n (Dec. 9, 2005), available at http://www.dolir.mo.gov/LIRC/wcdecisions
/WCDEC05/Schoemehl,%20Fred.htm.
40. Schoemehl, 217 S.W.3d at 901.
41. Id.
42. Id.; Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.020.1 (Supp. 2008). The definition of employee
under § 287.020.1 provides:
The word 'employee' as used in this chapter shall be construed to mean
every person in the service of any employer, as defined in this chapter,
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, or under
any appointment or election, including executive officers of corporations.
Except as otherwise provided in section 287.200, any reference to any
employee who has been injured shall, when the employee is dead, also
include his dependents, and other persons to whom compensation may be
payable.
Id.
43. Schoemehl v. Treasurer of Mo., No. 27418, 2006 WL 1229637, *6-7 (Mo.
App. S.D. May 09, 2006).
44. Schoemehl, 217 S.W.3d at 901-02.
45. Id.(discussing MO. REV. STAT. §§ 287.230.2, 287.200.1, 287.020.1 (2000)).
46. Id.at 901-03.
47. Id.at 901.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2009

7

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 74, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 8
MISSOURI LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 74

employee's dependents, even after the employee's death. 48 Thus, because the
employee's dependent was legally considered an "employee," she was
entitled to continued payment of the employee's PTD benefits.4 9 As a result,
the court reversed the award and remanded the claim. 5°
Judge Stith dissented, finding that the majority incorrectly interpreted
the workers' compensation statutes. 51 Specifically, Judge Stith criticized the
majority for "improperly excis[ing]" statutory language that limited
compensation benefits to the lifetime of the employee "only during the
continuance of such disability." 52 She argued that the injury and resulting
disability to the deceased employee necessarily discontinued upon his death,
and thus, the plaintiff was not entitled to PTD payments. 53 Additionally, in
response to the plaintiffs equal protection claim arguing that dependents of
employees with permanent total disabilities are treated worse than dependents
of employees with permanent partial disabilities, Judge Stith stated that the
calculation of benefits distinction "reflects the differing nature of the injuries
for which the awards are made." 54 She explained that PPD benefits are given
a fixed value to reflect the average number of weeks an injury causes the
worker to suffer, while PTD benefits are flexible to ensure that the injured
person will receive benefits if the disability continues.5 5 Thus, she concluded,
the distinction between the calculations of benefits is rational.56
After the Schoemehl decision was handed down, some predicted 5it7
would have a far-reaching impact on the workers' compensation system.
As applied, the decision allowed surviving dependents to step into the shoes
of deceased employees and receive PTD benefits for the lifetime of those
dependents. 58 This creates a significant increase in the Fund's liability
because where the Fund is responsible for PTD benefits and the employee
dies with young dependents, the Fund would be responsible for benefits that
could potentially continue for decades after the death of the disabled
employee. Accordingly, determining the value of the disability benefits for

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 902.
Id. at 903.
Id.
Id. at 903-04 (Stith, J., dissenting). Judges Limbaugh and Price joined. Id. at

903.
52. Id. at 904 (quoting Leibson v. Henry, 204 S.W.2d 310, 315 (Mo. 1947) (en
banc)).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 904-05. Judge Stith supported the flexible calculation of permanent
partial disability benefits "because the legislative scheme presumes that the disability
preventing the employee from working will continue until the injured person dies, and
a person's date of death is not predictable." Id. at 905.
56. Id. at 905.
57. Lindsey & Kennedy, supranote 4.
58. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol74/iss2/8

8

2009]

McClitis: McClitis: Missouri's Second Injury Fund
MISSO URIS SECOND INJURY FUND

purposes of exposure and settlement now requires consideration of the injured
employee's dependents and their potential life spans.59
Commentators also predicted that the decision would allow cases
awarding PTD benefits to be re-opened to pay benefits to the surviving
dependents of deceased employees. 6? The Missouri Supreme Court addressed
this issue in Strait v. Treasurerof Missouri.6' In Strait, the court determined
that the Schoemehl decision is applicable to a deceased employee's disability
benefits when the employee's claim for benefits is pending in the workers'
compensation system or is pending on appeal. 62 Thus, the Schoemehl
decision does not apply to claims for benefits that are final and closed.63 The
court reasoned that prospective application of the Schoemehl opinion is
proper for all actions pending on, and prospective to, the date on which the
opinion was issued. 64 The plaintiff in Strait brought a claim for the lifetime
PTD benefits of a deceased employee.65 The court found that since the
plaintiffs claim was still pending on the date of Schoemehl decision,
Schoemehl applied and the dependents of the deceased employee were
entitled to disability benefits from the Fund.66
Judge Limbaugh dissented, arguing that Strait brought to light some of
the "unintended and unforeseen consequences of this Court's wrongly
decided opinion in Schoemehl.' 6 7 Specifically, he noted that the majority's
holding, which determined entitlement to disability benefits depending on
whether the original claim is still pending or final and closed, was
inconsistent with Schoemehl and workers' compensation statutes as it "limits
payments only to those dependents with the perverse good fortune of having
their decedents die while the case was still pending."6 Limbaugh concluded
that the majority's holding was, in his opinion, "simply a poor invention
designed... in an effort to minimize the mischief caused by the bad decision
in Schoemehr' and that Schoemehl should have been overturned.69

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 257 S.W.3d 600 (Mo. 2008) (en banc).
62. Id.at 602-03.
63. Id.; see also Buescher v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 254 S.W.3d 105,
108 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008) (finding that "[o]nce the time for appeal has expired, the
[Labor and Industrial Relations] Commission has no authority to further delineate,
expound upon, or enforce the award.").
64. Strait,257 S.W.3d. at 602-03.
65. Id.at 600-01.
66. Id.at 602.
67. Id.at 603 (Limbaugh, J., dissenting). Judges Price and Breckenridge joined.
Id.
68. Id.at 604.
69. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
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B. The FinancialStatus of the Second Injury Fund
Shortly after the decision in Schoemehl, concerns arose regarding the

solvency of the Fund. In January 2007, then-Missouri Governor Matt Blunt
requested the State Auditor's Office ("SAO") conduct an audit of the Fund. 70
Blunt stated that the Fund's resources may soon be depleted and that the
Schoemehl decision could potentially complicate the issue, as benefits paid
from the Fund would be extended to dependents of covered employees for the
duration of their lives following the employee's death.7 '
In its official audit, the SAO surmised that the Fund would likely
become insolvent during 2008.72 The SAO determined that changes to the
workers' compensation law in 2005, which capped the Fund's surcharge rate
at 3%, limited the ability of the Fund to generate sufficient revenue to cover
expenditures. 73 Prior to the 3% surcharge cap in 2005, the surcharge rate
formula was adjusted on o74
a yearly basis to ensure sufficient funds for
expenditures plus a 10% cushion. Considering the history of the surcharge
rate, the SAO found that the rate rarely exceeded 3% in the past.15 As a
result, the SAO concluded that the Fund was unable to accumulate an
adequate amount of finances because the surcharge rate was not variable
above

3%.76

The SAO audit also addressed the decision in Schoemehl and concluded
that the impact of Schoemehl on the Fund was unclear because no information
regarding the existence of dependents was kept on file for claimants.77
However, regarding the short-term impact of Schoemehl through 2009, the
audit found the impact would likely be minimal due to the low number of
78
PTD recipients and the even lower number of recipients who die each year.
The SAO reasoned that the short-term impact would be minimal because
there were only 745 active claims of PTD benefits being paid by the Fund
79
that could potentially result in additional liability from the decision.
Additionally, the SAO stated that the impact would be slight because, on
MONTEE, supra note 5, at 27 (Governor's letter requesting audit).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 9.
73. Id. at 10; see also S. 1 & 130, 93d Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2005);
Mo. REV.STAT. § 287.715.2 (Supp. 2008).
74. MONTEE, supra note 5, at 10.
75. Id. "Historically, the surcharge rate has exceeded 3 percent in 3 of the
previous II years, with a high of 4 percent in 2003 and 2004." Id.
76. Id. at 15.
77. Id. at 12. This audit was issued before the decision in Strait. See supra notes
61-69 and accompanying text.
78. MONTEE, supra note 5, at 15.
79. Id.These figures were as of January 30, 2007. Id.at 12. The Audit also
noted that for these 745 cases, "the division paid $17.8 million on those cases .... for
an average of approximately $23,900 per case." Id.

70.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol74/iss2/8
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average, only thirteen PTD payment recipients died each year.80 Thus, in the
short-term, Schoemehl would only affect the recipients who died from 2007
through 2009, which, if came out as averaged, would be thirty-nine
recipients.
Despite the findings of the SAO, then-Governor Matt Blunt determined
in April 2007 that the SAO audit was inadequate due to the scope of the study
and its lack of recommendations, and requested an independent actuarial
review of the Fund.8 ' The independent actuarial review, completed in July
2007, found that the Fund would become insolvent in 2009, assuming the
Fund's surcharge rate remained capped at 3%.82 Much like the audit, the
actuarial review found that the 3% surcharge cap was the major cause of the
Fund's projected insolvency.83 The review stated that "it does not appear that
there are many avenues available to avert the insolvency [of the Fund] short
of increasing the maximum rate of assessment."8 4 To allow the Fund to
remain balanced at zero, the actuarial review estimated that the Fund
surcharge could be set a 3.69% in 2009, and increased to 3.92% in 2012.5
The actuarial review also made a number of findings concerning the
potential effects of Schoemehl and the liability of the Fund if it should stop
accepting claims. Regarding the effect of Schoemehl, the actuarial review
projected that the decision would have a "very minor" financial impact on the
Fund through 2012.6 However, the actuarial review also indicated that the
liability of the Fund would grow significantly after 2012 because the costs
due to Schoemehl would start to be paid at the end of the original claimants'
PTD awards. 87 The actuarial review also projected the liability of the Fund if
it were to stop accepting claims or be terminated. The review estimated that
if claims were no longer accepted after the 2008 year, the Fund would still be
liable to disability benefits 88claimants for $992 million nominally, or $644
million in present day value.

80. Id. The average was computed using the years 2001 through 2006. Id.
81. See Actuarial Review, supra note 7. Governor Blunt requested a study that
concentrated on the state's expenditures to determine what is causing their growth,
along with a historical perspective of the Fund since 1993. Id.at 1.
82. Id.at 3.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.at 5.
86. Id.According to the review's calculations, the Fund will pay out about $4
million more in benefits due to Schoemehl from 2008 to 2012. Id.at 4-5 tbls.2a & 2b.
87. Id.at 8. Note that the ActuarialReview made these determinations prior to
the decision in Strait. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
88. Actuarial Review, supra note 7, at 5-6 & tbl.3a). The present day value
figures assume earning 4% interest per year. Id.at 5. These values are rounded.
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C. Legislative Response to Schoemehl
State legislators criticized the Schoemehl decision and introduced bills
during the 2007 legislative session that attempted to abrogate it.8 9 For
instance, then-Senator Chris Koster 9° said that "the [Schoemehl] decision was
correct based on the language in the statute, but the result was far from what
anyone intended." 91 Representative Steven Hunter 92 stated that the ruling
was problematic because the Fund must pay unexpected benefits. 93 Hunter
called for abrogation of the Schoemehl decision and also called for
termination of the Fund.94 Despite efforts to abrogate Schoemehl, however,
the 2007 legislature ultimately could not come to a 95resolution and did not
pass any bills that overturned the Schoemehl decision.
During the 2008 session, however, the legislature was able to abrogate
the Schoemehl decision by instituting the "Schoemehl fix," which invalidated
the state's court ruling. 96 The fix amended § 287.230 by adding a provision
that states: "[i]n applying the provisions of this chapter, it is the intent of the
legislature to reject and abrogate the holding in Schoemehl v. Treasurerof the
State of Missouri, 217 S.W.3d 900 (Mo.' 972007), and all cases citing,
interpreting, applying, or following this case.
While the "'Schoemehl fix"' has limited the payment of benefits to
claimant's dependents, questions remain regarding the solvency and future of
Missouri's Second Injury Fund. Should the Fund be eliminated or reformed?
Is the Fund still needed? Are any adjustments or alternatives available to
address the solvency of the Fund? The following Comment will shed light on
the answers to these questions.

89. Scott Lauck, Missouri Senate May Kill Second Injury Fund, Mo. LAW.

WKLY., Feb. 19, 2007.
90. Chris Koster, Democrat for Missouri Attorney General, Biography,
http://www.chriskoster.com/bio/bio.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). Koster was a
Republican at the time he made this comment. Id.
91. Lauck, supra note 89.
92. Representative Steven Hunter, District 127 Republican, http://www.house
.mo.gov/billtracking/billsO81/member/meml27.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2009).
93. Lauck, supra note 89.
94. Id.

95. Scott Lauck, Missouri Gov. Blunt Considering Second Injury Fund Special
Session, ST. Louis DAILY RECORD & ST. Louis COUNTIAN, June 28, 2007.

96. Tony Messenger, Missouri Legislature Ends Session with a Rush, ST. LOUIS
May 17, 2008, available at http://www.stltoday.com/stltoday/news/
stories.nsf/politics/story/02A29DD73BE5642E8625744C00 I25B I0?OpenDocument.
While the legislature instituted the "Schoemehl fix," it avoided proposals to terminate
the Second Injury Fund and to move control of the Fund away from the attorney
general. Id.
97. H.R. 1883, 94th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008).
POST-DISPATCH,
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V. COMMENT

As recently as 1991, second injury funds, sometimes called subsequent
injury or special indemnity funds, were present in each state and in federal
jurisdictions as well.98 In recent years, however, approximately half of the
states have eliminated their respective funds or "sunset-ed" their funds by
refusing claims from the Fund after a certain date. 99 Only about twenty
states, including Missouri, have second injury funds that remain open to new
injury claims.' 0
Missouri's Second Injury Fund is now in a state of unrest as legislators
address its financial problems.
A number of Missouri legislators
unsuccessfully attempted to repeal or eliminate the Fund during the 2008
session,' 01 and at this point it is unclear what the 2009 legislative session will
bring for the Fund. One thing is certain - the 2009 Legislature must decide
whether the Fund should stay or go. If the legislature decides to continue the
Fund, it must also decide what changes are necessary to maintain the Fund.
Overall, these decisions will require consideration of the future liability of the
Fund, the need for the Fund, as well as potential adjustments and alternatives
in order to provide adequate finances to the Fund.

98. Catherine M. Doud, Comment, Oklahoma 's Special Indemnity Fund.-A Fund
Without a Function?,30 TULSA L.J. 745, 745 (1995).
99. Zachary D. Schurin, Note, Monkey-Business: Connecticut's Six Billion
Dollar Gorilla and the Insufficieny of the Emergence of the ADA as Justificationfor
the Elimination of Second Injury Funds, 7 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 135, 136 (2007)
(citing U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, STATISTICS AND RESEARCH CENTER, ANALYSIS
OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS 105 chart xI (2005)). "Alabama, Kentucky,
Maine, and New Mexico have eliminated their [second injury funds] entirely." Id. at
136 n. 12. "[Second injury funds] in Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia have been
closed for new claims." Id, "New York, South Carolina, and Georgia have enacted
legislation to phase out their respective [second injury funds]." W. Frederick Uehlein
& Mark Nevils, Second Injury Funds in Flux; Opportunities, Changes, and
Questions, 17 J. WORKERS COMPENSATION 19, 19 (2008).
100. Uehlein & Nevils, supra note 99, at 19.
101. See H.R. 2310, 94th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008) (proposing the
repeal of the Workers' Compensation Second Injury Fund); H.R. 2308, 94th Gen.
Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.R. 2309, 94th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2008); H.R. 2302, 94th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008) (proposing the
elimination of injured workers' benefits under the Fund for permanent partial
injuries).
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A. Future Liability of Missouri'sSecond Injury Fund
The legislature must first understand that eliminating or "sunset-ing"
Missouri's Fund does not simultaneously eliminate the liability of the Fund
for claims being paid. In fact, discontinuing the Fund would leave the Fund
responsible for hundreds of millions of dollars of previously incurred
liabilities that must be paid off in the coming decades. Early estimates show
that if the Fund stopped accepting claims after January 1, 2009, the Fund
would 02
be liable for $992 million nominally, or $644 million in present day
value. 1
If the legislature decides to eliminate the Fund despite its liability, the
state may choose to rid itself of the remaining liability by obtaining a
reinsurer to continue paying out already processed claims. 103 However, it is
questionable whether the state would find an appealing reinsurer. The Fund's
remaining liability is a significant amount of money and as such, it is likely a
reinsurer would demand a large upfront payment to assume the Fund's
liabilities. 10 4 The upfront amount requested by the reinsurer would likely be
of such a magnitude that the state would prefer to address the liabilities of the
Fund itself.
It is also important for the legislature to fully understand the extent of
liability that will be attributed to the Schoemehl debacle. Despite completion
of the Schoemehl fix, the Missouri Supreme Court's decision may have some
lingering effects on the Fund for years to come. The Schoemehl decision will
apply to claims which are (1) pending in the workers' compensation system,
and (2) pending during the period of time between the date of the Schoemehl
decision' 05 and the06 effective date of the Schoemehl fix, as the fix affected a
substantive right.'
As a result, the application of Schoemehl is limited to, as Judge
Limbaugh put it, "only to those dependents with the perverse good fortune of
having their decedents die while the case was still pending." 07 Thus, the
102. Actuarial Review, supra note 7, at 5, 6 tbl.3a; see supra note 88 and
accompanying text.
103. A "reinsurer" is "[a]n insurer that assumes all or part of a risk underwritten
by another insurer, usu[ally] in exchange for a percentage of the original premium."
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1312 (8th ed. 2004).
104. ActuarialReview, supra note 7, at 3.
105. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
106. See State ex rel. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Buder, 515 S.W.2d 409,
410 (Mo. 1974) (en banc) (recognizing "that a statute shall not be applied
retrospectively [except] (1) where the legislature manifests a clear intent that it do so
[or] (2) where statute is procedural only and does not affect any substantive right of
parties").
107. Strait v. Treasurer of Mo., 257 S.W.3d 600, 604 (Mo. 2008) (en banc)
(Limbaugh, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol74/iss2/8
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Fund's liability from Schoemehl will only apply to claimants who (1) had
their claim in the workers' compensation system during the eighteen-month
window between the Schoemehl decision and its subsequent abrogation, (2)
received an award for PTD benefits, and (3) died from unrelated causes
before the award was final and closed. It seems unlikely that a great deal of
claimants will meet each of these three requirements. One attorney has gone
as far as saying that the dependents of the claimants in Schoemehl and Strait
may be the only people who met these
10 8 requirements and thus, were awarded
the PTD benefits of a dead relative.
While the number of claimants who are covered under Schoemehl are
likely few and far between, one cannot deny the substantial lingering effect
this decision could potentially have. Under Schoemehl, the surviving
dependents are entitled to disability benefits for their lifetime. Accordingly,
if the surviving dependents are young in age, the disability benefits could
continue for many decades, and the Fund would be responsible for paying
these benefits over this period of time. Thus, despite the Schoemehl
decision's effect likely being minor in terms of number of claimants, it has
the potential to constitute a significant amount of
0 9 the Fund's future liability as
PTD benefits claims are the costliest of claims.'
B. Has the ADA Eliminatedthe Needfor Missouri's Second Injury
Fund?
It has been more than sixty years since Missouri first established the
Second Injury Fund, and some believe that the Fund is no longer necessary
because its underlying goals and policies are adequately supported by other
law. Specifically, it is argued that Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) and other state law anti-discrimination provisions have rendered
second injury funds obsolete.' 2 The belief is that because the ADA and state
anti-discrimination laws prevent employers from discriminating against
disabled workers in hiring, the additional financial incentives of second injury
funds are not necessary.
In other words, these newer laws make it "no

108. Donna Walter, Is This the End of Schoemehl as We Know It? Missouri
Supreme Court, ST. Louis DAILY REcORD & ST. Louis CoUNTiAN, July 16, 2008

(quoting James G. Krispin, attorney for dependents in Strait), available at
http://fmdarticles.com/p/articles/miqn4185/is 20080716/ain27921788.
109. See Actuarial Review, supra note 7, at 7-8. Despite relatively few claims,
PTD claims are costly and consisted of over 32% of the Fund's expenditures in 2008.
Id.at 7 tbl.4a.
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
111. Doud, supra note 98, at 766-67.
112. Id.at 747.
113. Id.at 765.
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longer.., necessary to bribe employers into hiring and keeping handicapped
1 14
workers [as] [e]mployers cannot discriminate against these workers."
Supporters of second injury funds note that the ADA and state antidiscrimination laws, despite preventing discrimination of the disabled, do not
and could not adequately replace second injury funds for a number of
reasons. For one, the ADA only applies to employers with fifteen or more
employees,"15 and second injury funds are still appropriate as small
employers today face the same risk past employers faced - the risk of
increased liability in hiring disabled persons. 1I As a result, because small
employers are outside the scope of the ADA, it is unlikely they will hire and
retain workers with preexisting disabilities in the absence of a state second
injury fund. 117 The same applies for state anti-discrimination laws, which8
often impose minimum employee thresholds that are lower than the ADA."
For example, the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) makes it unlawful for
employers with six or more employees" 19 to discriminate on the basis of a
number of classes, including disability.' 20 Despite this lower threshold, a
substantial number of employers are still exempt from the prohibition against
disability discrimination in Missouri - at least 83,000 employers according to
2006 U.S. Census Bureau figures. 121 Thus, at least 83,000 employers in
Missouri would be exempt from MHRA and ADA, and removal of the Fund
would give these employers no incentive to consider hiring and retaining
individuals with preexisting disabilities.
It has also been argued that second injury funds are still needed because
the ADA's threshold requirements for disability are a high bar for employees
to overcome and, as a result, a number of disabled individuals are excluded
from ADA protection. 122 Under the ADA's requirements, some disabled
individuals are stuck in the middle of being disabled and being protected
because their disabilities are severe enough to impact their chances of
acquiring
a job but not severe enough to be identified as disabled under the
123
ADA.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 766.
See42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2000).
Schurin, supra note 99, at 147-48 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(5)(A) (2000)).
Id. at 148-49.
Id. at 148.
See generally JONATHAN R. MOOK, AMERICANS WITH

DISABILITIES ACT: EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYER OBLIGATIONS § 10

(2009)

(survey of "State Statutes Prohibiting Discrimination on the Basis of Disability").
119. Mo. REv. STAT. § 213.010(7) (2000).
120. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 213.055.1 (2000).
121. U.S. CENsus BUREAU, 2006 COUNTY BusINEss PATTERNS (NAICS),
MIssouRi MAJOR INDUsTRY (2006). In 2006, Missouri had a total of 154,546
employers, with 83,089 employers employing I to 4 employees. Id.
122. Schurin, supra note 99, at 151.
123. Id. Employees did not qualify as disabled under the ADA because they were
not prevented "from obtaining a job within a 'broad range of jobs."' Id. (quoting 29

C.F.R. § 1630.20) (1991)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)-(j) (2008).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol74/iss2/8
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However, concerns regarding the threshold requirements of disability
may have been rendered moot by recent amendments to the ADA. Scholars
assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008124 note that the definition of
disability will no longer be subject to demanding standards and will "be
construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this Act, to the
maximum extent permitted by the terms of this Act."'' 25 Additionally, the
requirements for impairment are projected to be less restrictive than previous
standards, and the definition of "major life activity" will be construed more
broadly. 126 While the amendments have yet to be applied, it seems almost
certain that the amendments will allow more employees to meet the threshold
requirements of disability under the ADA.
With the recent changes to the ADA, some may conclude that the ADA,
plus its amendments, can sufficiently supplant the purpose of second injury
funds. However, this conclusion is far from certain. Currently, it remains to
be seen whether the ADA Amendments will actually lead to more employees
meeting the threshold disability requirements for protection, and, more
importantly, whether employees will actually recover relief more often in
ADA cases. In other words, merely meeting the threshold requirements of
the ADA does not guarantee protection against discrimination or recovery
from an employer. As a result, it will be difficult for the legislature to rely on
changes to the ADA as a basis for eliminating the Fund for the time being.
It is also important to note that the Fund and ADA have separate goals
and functions, despite the perception that they overlap. The ADA, in its
broadest sense, is to deter employers from discriminating against applicants
and employees with disabilities by holding employers liable for damages.127
For situations relevant to the Fund, the ADA only applies to pre-employment
1 28
activity - the employer's hiring procedures and decision-making.

124. Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555.
125. Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with
Disabilities Act: Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Nw. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 217, 219 (2008) (citing ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555).
126. Id.at 218, 221.
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2000) (finding "discrimination against
individuals with disabilities persists in ...employment"); § 12101(b)(1) (stating the
one of the purposes of the ADA is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities").
128. Specifically, the ADA precludes pre-employment questions pertaining to
prior workers' compensation claims or the existence, nature, or severity of a
disability. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13(a) (2008).
From the employer's perspective in states with second injury funds, applicant
qualifications aside, an employer can make one of two choices: one, hire the disabled
applicant to avoid disability discrimination liability and have the benefit of the Fund
to limit its liability in the event of an injury; or two, not hire the disabled applicant
and have potential disability discrimination liability.
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The goals of the Fund, however, are to encourage employers to hire and
retain individuals with disabilities by providing them with the benefits of the
Fund - spreading the risk of heightened liability across all employers while
simultaneously limiting the liability of employers in workers' compensation
claims involving an employee with a preexisting disability.' 29 Accordingly,
the goals of the Fund apply to the period of employment in addition to
employer pre-employment activity. Thus, its goals not only encourage
employers to hire disabled workers, but they also assist employers to retain
such workers as it spreads the costs of expensive disability claims across all
employers of the state.' If the Fund were eliminated, individual employers
would bear the full cost for injuries combining with a preexisting disability to
create a greater or total disability.
Compared to the ADA, Missouri's Second Injury Fund achieves broader
coverage and includes policy goals that benefit applicants, employees, and
employers prior to and during employment. As such, it can hardly be said
that state and federal prohibitions against disability discrimination adequately
replace the financial incentives of second injury funds.
C. Adjustments andAlternatives: Solutionsfor FundingMissouri's
Second Injury Fund
The debate regarding continuation of the Fund goes beyond the
application of disability anti-discrimination laws. In Missouri, the central
issues with the Fund are its financial status and future funding. With the
Second Injury Fund projected to become insolvent sometime during 2009,131
the legislature must act quickly to ensure that the Fund will continue. The
best way to prevent the Fund's insolvency in the near future may be to adjust
the applicable surcharge rate.
The Fund is financed by a surcharge on a percent of assessable
premiums
that is levied on insurance companies and self-insurers four times a
132
year.
Previously,
the to
surcharge
was calculated
yearly
on the
a prospective
"pay-as-you-go" basis
generaterate
enough
revenue to
cover
projected

129. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
130. Uehlein & Nevils, supranote 99, at 22.
131. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
132. ActuarialReview, supra note 7, at 1.
For insurers, assessable premiums for a particular calendar year are
written premiums before the application of a deductible credit on policies
with inception dates in that calendar year. For self-insurers, assessable
premiums are based on payrolls and estimated pure premiums (losses per
payroll), with an experience rating modification. The surcharge rate is
based on expected calendar year losses.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol74/iss2/8
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33 However, in
expenditures for the upcoming year plus a 10% cushion.'
134
3%.
at
rate
surcharge
2005, the legislature capped the
Both the actuarial review and SAO audit found the 2005 3% cap to be a
major impediment to maintaining solvency of the Fund. 135 The actuarial
review went as far as stating that the Fund will become insolvent in 2009
unless the 3% cap is removed or additional finances are appropriated to the
Fund. 136 As a result, the surcharge rate cap has created an exclusive and
inflexible financing mechanism that cannot be adjusted to meet increased
expenditure demands. The legislature's days of financing by placing all their
funding eggs in one rigid basket must end if the Fund is to continue paying
benefits.
Removing the 3% cap and returning to the "pay-as-you-go" calculation
may be the best short-term solution to the Fund's impending insolvency.
Based on projections, removing the 3% cap would allow the Fund to meet all
2009 expenditures without requiring a huge surcharge. If the legislature
targets a Fund balance of zero, the surcharge percent would only increase by
.69% in 2009.137 Further, returning to the uncapped "pay-as-you-go" method
should not create any significant problems as it was applied before and is
simple to maintain.
Accordingly, adjusting the surcharge rate appears to be
the best and sole viable remedy for ensuring the Fund's solvency in 2009,
outside of appropriating or borrowing monies.
Removal of the 3% cap, however, should not be utilized as a permanent
solution. The "pay-as-you-go" mechanism is appropriate for the immediate
future because it creates lower current assessments in exchange for creating
more costly future assessments. 139 These costly future assessments come
about because the "pay-as-you-go" funding mechanisms are calculated on a
calendar year basis and do not account for the ultimate cost of claims. 140
Considering the future assessments, the legislature would be well-advised to
limit its use of the "pay-as-you-go" mechanism to the immediate solvency
issues with the Fund. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly,

133. Id.; MONTEE, supra note 5, at 10.
134. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
135. Actuarial Review, supra note 7, at 12 ("The 3% cap on the surcharge effected
in 2005 greatly limits [the state agency's] ability to make up prior year deficits by
increasing surcharges for future years. .. [and a]dditionally, the 3% cap appears to be
inadequate in the near future."); MONTEE, supra note 5, at 10 ("[C]apping the [F]und
surcharge rate at 3 percent limits [the state agency's] ability to generate revenues
sufficient to cover [F]und expenditures.").
136. Actuarial Review, supra note 7, at 10.
137. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
138. Actuarial Review, supra note 7, at 12. "Pay-as-you-go" funding is
reasonable to continue operating into the future so "long as inflation rates stay steady,
there are no shocks to the system, the economy is growing, and the managers of the
programs understand the underlying claims dynamics." Id.
139. Id. at 11.
140. Id.
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reinstituting the "pay-as-you-go" funding mechanism on a temporary basis
gives the legislature sufficient time to consider and implement other methods
to ensure the long-term solvency of the Fund.
With the current balance of the Fund so close to zero, the legislature will
also need to consider long-term options for ensuring the Fund's solvency.
The legislature may address the long-term solvency of the Fund by adjusting
its current provisions and implementing alternative funding methods used in
other states. One potential adjustment, which was proposed in 2008,141 is to
restrict or lessen the authority of the Attorney General to enter into lump sum
settlements.
In cases against the Fund, the state treasurer receives advice and is
represented by the Attorney General of Missouri.142 The Attorney General is
entitled to defend claims against the Fund, or allowed to enter into
compromise settlements. 143 Currently, the Attorney General has the authority
to settle Fund claims for a maximum of $60,000.144 Prior to 2001, the
Attorney General had a maximum settlement amount of $40,000.145
For a number of years, it has been a common practice of the Attorney
General to enter into settlements for PPD claims and to not settle PTD
claims. 46 For instance, in 2007, PTD lump sum payments (which are not
frequent) and PPD payments (which are almost always lump sum settlements)
totaled $47.9 million - over two-thirds of the Fund's expenditures for that
year. 147 The total number of settlements is also high as most settlements
entered into by the Attorney General are for much less than $60,00014
with
149
the average claim settled for about $10,000 over the past five years.

141. H.R. 2308, 94th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008), available at
http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills08libiltxt/intro/HB2308I.htm ("there shall
be no compromise settlements contemplated by section 287.390 paid from the second
injury fund in an amount greater than ten thousand dollars").
142. Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.220.2 (2000).
143. Id.
144. MONTEE, supra note 5, at 5.
145. ActuarialReview, supra note 7, at 13.
146. Id. This distinction is likely the result of the payment system under each of
the claims. PPD claims are more likely to settle because their awards are fixed for a
period time based on statutory guidelines, which makes it easier to predict an award
for purposes of settlement. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. PTD claims,
however, are continuous for the lifetime of the employee, therefore making it difficult
to predict a settlement amount. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
147. Actuarial Review, supra note 7, at 7 tbls.4a & 4b. This is clearly not an ideal
set of data because it includes all PPD claims. See id. However, because nearly all
successful PPD claims involve lump sum settlements, see supra text accompanying
note 146, the data is relevant.
148. ActuarialReview, supra note 7, at 13 tbl.9. From 1995 to 2006, the average
lump sum paid per resolvable claim ranged from $5,500 to $10,000. Id.
149. Id.
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Considering the difference between the average settlement amount and
the maximum settlement amount, reducing the settlement authority of the
Attorney General will not have a significant effect on settlement amounts
unless it is a drastic reduction. Some legislators have pushed for such a
reduction, calling for the Attorney General's settlement authority to be
capped at $10,000.150
However, a reduction of this caliber is likely to impose direct costs on
the Fund and the Attorney General's Office. The Fund is responsible for all
legal expenses of the Attorney General's office including fees and travel
costs.' 51 With a lower settlement maximum, the Attorney General may be
forced to use additional resources to represent the Fund when a settlement
would be more efficient. For instance, the Attorney General would not be
able to settle relatively undisputed PPD claims that are clearly above their
maximum settlement authority. Further, a reduction in the settlement
authority would run completely counter to the reasons for the increase in
settlement authority in 2001. That year, the state increased the settlement
authority of the Attorney General from $40,000 to $60,000 to increase its
efficiency in handling and settling cases, and also to lessen the number of
claims in court and the Fund's exposure to long-term liabilities. 52 Reducing
the settlement authority of the Attorney General would return settlements to
the pre-2001 form, and likely raise the same efficiency concerns a second
time.
It is questionable, however, whether the 2001 increase in settlement
authority is accomplishing the goals intended by its passage. Data shows that
the average resolvable claim settlement amount increased from approximately
$7,000 to $10,000 following the 2001 increase in the maximum settlement
amount from $40,000 to $60,000.'
Additionally, the expenditures of the
Fund increased after the 2001 increase in settlement authority. The Fund's
benefit expenditures increased from $29.9 million in 2000 to $39.3 million in
2001, and continued to rise until benefit expenditures reached $63.8 million
in 2006. 54 While these figures do not delineate between lump sum
settlements and awards, the increase in Fund expenditures cannot be ignored.
It is also questionable whether the increase in settlement authority reduced
the number of claims brought in court. The number of claims filed increased
from 12,060 in 2000 to 13,255 in 2001, and remained above 13,000 per year

150. See supra note 141.

151. Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.220.2 (2000) ("Any legal expenses incurred by the
attorney general's office in the handling of [Second Injury Fund] claims, including,
but not limited to, medical examination fees, expert witness fees, court reporter
expenses, travel costs, and related legal expenses shall be paid by the [F]und.").
152. MONTEE, supra note 5, at 5.
153. ActuarialReview, supra note 7, at 13 tbl.9.
154. MONTEE, supra note 5, at 24 app. I, tbl.I.1.
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through 2005.155 However, the number of claims filed did drop to 10,591 in
2006. "
Considering that about two-thirds of the Fund's expenditures are lump
sum settlements and that the average settlement has increased with the
Attorney General's settlement authority, changes may be necessary to achieve
financial stability within the Fund. A decrease in the settlement authority of
the Attorney General is one solution to reducing the expenditures by the
Fund, but the extent of the reduction is difficult to assess. The 2009
Legislature would be well-advised to balance the efficiency of settling claims
with the need to reduce the average settlement amount when deciding
whether to reduce the settlement authority of the Attorney General and by
how much. A more detailed analysis of the Attorney General's efficiency
served by a $60,000 settlement authority is necessary to come up with a clear
answer. It is possible that reducing the settlement authority to $40,000 could
lead to a decrease in the average amount per resolvable claim, but at the same
time could lead to the inefficiencies that led to the initial increase in
settlement authority.
It would be wise for the legislature to consider including an exception to
the Attorney General's maximum settlement authority for dependents of
claimants coming under Schoemehl157 Instead of continuing disability
payments for decades, it may be advantageous for the state and the surviving
dependents to reach a settlement. As such, an exception to the maximum
settlement authority will allow the Attorney General to settle claims with
surviving dependents under Schoemehl as it is highly unlikely a settlement
will be reached with a $60,000 settlement maximum.
The legislature may also want to consider potential adjustments to
current Fund provisions in order to better defend the Fund and to place a
higher burden on claimants to show the existence of liability. In order to
shore up the state's defense against Fund claimants, the legislature may want
to adjust the provisions on medical examination.
Under the current
provisions, the Fund is not entitled to have a doctor or vocational expert
examine a claimant.' 8 This limitation prevents the Fund from scrutinizing
the disability level assessed by the claimant's doctor, and also prevents the
Fund from verifying that the claimant has met the minimum thresholds for a
claim. Accordingly, the absence of the right to examine claimants may result
in claimants receiving higher awards and lump sum settlements.1 59 Allowing
the Fund to examine claimants with its doctors or vocational experts will
improve defense
of the Fund, and may lower the costs from awards and
60
settlements. 1
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 26 app. III, tbl.III.1.
Id.
See supra Part IV.A.
ActuarialReview, supra note 7, at 10.
Id.
Id.
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The legislature may also place a higher burden on claimants seeking
Fund benefits by requiring evidence that their employer had prior knowledge
of their preexisting condition. 6 1 At least eight states require prior employer
knowledge before the time of the second injury, 62 and some states even
63
require the employer's knowledge to be supported with documentation.'
Placing the burden of employer knowledge on the claimant will reduce the
number of successful benefit claims and also prevent claims for post-hoc
disabilities.
The legislature may also attempt to pursue alternative funding sources
for ensuring the long-term solvency of the Fund. Often, other states use
multiple mechanisms to provide adequate funding for their respective injury
funds. One method the legislature should consider is the use of civil
penalties. Other second injury funds often require insurers and adjusters to
timely notify the employee and managing governmental agency of changes to
compensation being paid under workers' compensation.164 When timely
notice is not provided, the state institutes civil penalties.' 65 After collection
of the civil penalties, the state then 66deposits all or a portion of penalties
collected into the second injury fund.'
Another method the legislature should consider is taxing insurance
premium assessments. For instance, under Tennessee's injury fund, the state
taxes certain insurance carriers on premiums collected for workers'
compensation insurance in addition to a surcharge on the premiums.' 67 After
collecting the tax and surcharge,
the state deposits fifty percent of the
68
collection into the injury fund.'
Inclusion of other funding sources allows the Fund to build capital to
invest against future assessments. Over time, a combination of the "pay-asyou-go" surcharge plus some other form of funding will enable the Fund to
161. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1065(C)(2) (stating a claim is eligible
where "[t]he employer had knowledge of the permanent impairment at the time the
employee was hired, or that the employee continued in employment after the
employer acquired such knowledge").
162. See Mark J. Nevils, Second-Injury Funds: Still a Valuable Cost-Containment
Tool, CLAIMS Q., Mar. 2004, at 6, 7. The eight states are "Alaska, Arizona, Georgia,
Louisiana, New Hampshire, Nevada, South Carolina, and Massachusetts." Id.
163. Id. These states are Alaska, Nevada, and New Hampshire. Id.
164. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.155(c).
165. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.040(f) ("All amounts collected as civil
penalties under AS 23.30.155(c) shall be paid into the second injury fund."); ALASKA
STAT. § 23.30.155(c) (recognizing civil penalties against insurer or adjuster for failure
to provide timely notice); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-43-203(2)(a) (recognizing penalty for
failure to provide timely notice; fifty percent of penalty deposited into subsequent
injury fund).
166. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-43-203(2)(a).
167. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-401(b).
168. Id. at § 50-6-401(b)-(c) (recognizing that fifty percent of revenues from
premium tax are paid into second injury fund).
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reconsider instituting the same or a similar surcharge cap. As a result, the
Fund will be able to endure through its current near-insolvency period and
build adequate funds to maintain solvency for years and decades to come.
V. CONCLUSION
The 2009 state legislature appears to have its work cut out for it in
deciding what to do with Missouri's Second Injury Fund. The legislature
would be well-advised to consider the future liability of the Fund, the
enduring social goals it advances, and the proposed adjustments and
alternatives that can be utilized to improve its short-term and long-term
solvency.
It is this author's opinion that the legislature's best course of action
would be to first reinstitute the "pay-as-you-go" prospective surcharge rate at
a zero balance rate for three to five years in order to ensure short-term
solvency. Then, the legislature would be able to freely debate, refine, and
enact a number of adjustments and alternatives to the Fund's current
provisions in order to build capital and ensure long-term solvency. The use
of civil penalties, an employer prior knowledge requirement, and returning
Attorney General's lump sum settlement authority to $40,000 all seem
appropriate. Following implementation of these modifications, the legislature
should commission an actuarial review after two or three years. This will
give the legislature an opportunity to determine whether the implemented
modifications will adequately finance the Fund in the future. Refining and
69
implementing new modifications would be also be appropriate at this time. 1
The Second Injury Fund is no small problem. It will take a commitment
by the legislature to make changes to the Fund and to later reevaluate such
changes to determine their effectiveness. If the legislature will make this

169. Shortly before publication, a bill proposing changes to the Fund was
approved by a special committee. H.R. 522, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2009), available at http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills091/biltxt/commit/
HB0522C.HTM; see also Summary of the Committee Version of the Bill, H.R. 522,
95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Mo. 2009), available at http://house.
mo.gov/content.aspx?info=/bills09l/bilsum/commit/sHB522C.htm.
Some of the
bill's proposed changes to the Fund include lowering the compromise settlement
maximum to $40,000, subjecting non-settling claimants to independent medical and
vocational examinations, and allowing the Fund to dispute the reasonableness of
medical fees. Id. Perhaps most importantly, the bill proposes to sunset PPD claims
brought against the Fund, leaving only PTD claimants with potential access to the
Fund. Id. Supporters of the bill assert that raising the surcharge rate will not cure the
Fund's financial issue, but rather "continue to sink money into a financially distressed
fund." Id. Further, supporters acknowledge that the bill is not a permanent fix and
have included a provision to require completion of an actuarial study of the Fund in
2010. Id. Opponents contend that the bill deprives injured employees of their rights
because the bill decreases benefits instead of increasing revenue. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol74/iss2/8
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commitment, there is no doubt that the Second Injury Fund can maintain
solvency in the future.
JASON R. MCCLITIS

170

170. Juris Doctor candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2009. The
author would like to thank Professor Rafael Gely and Shayla Smith for their help in
developing this law summary.
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